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Abstract:  The  paper  analyzes  a  multi-country  extension  of  the  Barro  model  of 
productive public expenditure. In the presence of infrastructural externalities between 
countries the provision of infrastructure will be inefficiently low if countries do not 
coordinate.  This  provides  a  role  for  a  supra-national  body,  such  as  the  EU,  to 
coordinate the policies of the individual governments. It is shown how the supra-
national body can ensure the efficient level of infrastructure provision and, as a result, 
obtain an increased rate of growth. The results of the paper also show how capital 
flows between countries act to equalize growth rates. This can help explain why there 
is  limited  empirical  evidence  for  tax  rates  causing  a  difference  in  growth  rates 
between countries. This is not the same as saying taxation does not affect growth: if 
production requires public infrastructure then taxation is needed for growth. The flow 
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1.  Introduction 
One factor promoting endogenous growth is the supply of public infrastructure that 
complements the investments of the private sector. The importance of infrastructure is 
widely recognized, not least by the EU which pursues an active programme to support 
the investment activities of member states. The policy problem facing the EU is to 
ensure that member states undertake an efficient level of infrastructural expenditure 
that ensures the maximum rate of growth. The determination of the level has to take 
into account the full consequences of an infrastructure project for the EU, not just the 
direct  benefits  for  the  member  state  undertaking  the  investment.  There  are  three 
significant  issues  that  confront  this  policy  programme.  First,  infrastructural 
investment has significant spill-overs across member states. Second, mobility of the 
tax  base  results  in  tax  externalities  between  the  member  states,  and  between  the 
member states and the EU. Third, the EU is faced with a decision on how to allocate 
support  for  infrastructural  expenditure  across  the  different  member  states.  This 
interacts with the process of revenue-raising, and with the extent to which the projects 
are financed jointly by the EU and member states. 
  The economic modelling of the impact of infrastructure on economic growth 
has focussed on the Barro (1990) model of public expenditure as a public input and its 
extensions  (Chen  et  al.  2005,  Turnovsky,  1999).  This  literature  has  identified  the 
concept of an optimal level of expenditure, and has highlighted the deleterious effects 
of both inadequate and excessive expenditure. These are important insights, but do not 
address the spill-over issues that confront the EU. Infrastructural spill-overs between 
member states can be positive, which occurs when improvements in infrastructure in 
one member state raise productivity in another, or they can be negative if they induce 
relocation of capital between member states. In either case, it is important that the 
consequences of spill-overs are addressed in order that the role of productive public 
expenditure can be fully understood. Ignoring either form of spill-over will result in 
an inefficient level and allocation of expenditure.  
  The financing of infrastructure in the Barro model is through a simple tax on 
output levied at the national level. The position in the EU is much more complex. 
Each  member  state  levies  national  taxes.  Part  of  these  taxes  are  retained  by  the 
member states, the remainder is remitted to, and redistributed by, the EU. In economic 
terms, if there is mobility of the tax base then there are horizontal tax externalities 
between member states, and a vertical tax externality between member states and the 
EU. These tax externalities have a key role in determining the growth-maximizing 
level of expenditure. 
  In this paper  we  construct multi-country extensions of the Barro model of 
productive public infrastructure. In addition, the benefits of infrastructure spill-over 
between countries. The spill-over between countries is a form of positive externality 
which results in inefficient investment in infrastructure if countries act independently. 
If  there  are  infrastructural  externalities  between  countries  then  the  provision  of 
infrastructure will be inefficiently low when countries do not coordinate policies. This 
gives a role to a supra-national body, such as the EU, to act as a coordinator of the 
policies of individual governments. By ensuring the efficient level of infrastructural 
investment it is possible for the supra-national body to counter the externality and 
obtain a higher rate of growth.   The results of the paper also show how capital flows between countries act to 
equalize growth rates. The observation that capital flows reduce growth differentials 
between countries has been made previously by Razin and Yuen (1997). They argued 
that  labour  mobility  equalized  incomes  across  countries  when  there  were  human 
capital externalities. We demonstrate that the mobility of physical capital equalizes 
the growth rate across countries. Similar issues have also been addressed by Bianconi 
and Turnovsky (1997), but in a model that does not have public infrastructure. A 
substantial empirical literature has failed to find a convincing link between the rate of 
tax and the rate of economic growth. Our model provides a possible explanation for 
this:  In  a  cross-section  of  countries  the  infrastructural  externality  and  the  flow  of 
capital equalize the growth rate across countries regardless of the tax policy that each 
country  operates.  This  is  not  to  say  that  taxation  does  not  matter.  Actually,  the 
opposite is correct: Taxation is even more important than in a world without spill-
overs since additional public infrastructure in one country can raise the growth rate in 
all.  This  holds  if  all  countries  are  operating  with  less  than  the  optimum  level  of 
infrastructure, as they will be in an equilibrium without policy coordination. 
  Section 2 of the paper provides a brief review and discussion of evidence on 
the link between taxation and economic growth. A basic version of the endogenous 
growth  model  with  a  productive  public  input  is  analyzed  in  Section  3.  Section  4 
studies the role of a supra-national body in coordinating the choices of individual 
countries  when  there  is  an  infrastructural  externality.  The  analysis  is  extended  to 
incorporate capital mobility in Section 5. Conclusions are  given in Section 6. An 
appendix provides the calculations that support the results reported in the main text. 
 
2.  Empirical Evidence 
There is a considerable body of published work that investigates the link between the 
level of taxation and the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP). Much of this 
literature is summarized in Myles (2007). The conclusions that can be drawn from 
that literature are open to debate and interpretation, but the essential issues can be 
identified from considering some standard data. 
  Consider the data presented in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 plots the growth rate 
of US GDP and federal government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP since 1930. 
Trend lines have been fitted to the time series using ordinary least squares. The two 
trend lines show a steady rise in taxation (the upper line) and a very slight decline in 
the growth rate (the lower line). Although the variance of the growth rate is lower 
after 1940, statistical tests on US data have found no significant between the average 
rate of growth prior to 1942 and after 1942. The data for the UK in Figure 2 tell a very 
similar story. The trend lines show an increase in taxation but, in contrast to the US, 
an increase in the rate of growth. Over the long periods illustrated in these figures no 















Figure 1: US Tax and Growth Rates. 














Figure 2: UK Tax and Growth Rates. 
Source: Feinstein (1972), UK Revenue Statistics, Economic Trends 
  The interpretation of these figures must be considered carefully. There are two 
reasons for this. First, a contrast between the tax rate and the growth rate across time 
cannot answer the counter-factual question "if taxes had been lower, would growth 
have been higher?" An answer to this question requires, at least, a study involving a 
range of countries with different regimes. Second, there are substantive issues that 
have to be resolved about the definition of the tax rate that should enter into any such 
comparison. In particular, economic theory focuses on the marginal rate of tax as the 
determinant of behaviour but the figures employ the average rate of tax. 
  One route through which the first issue can be addressed is to consider the 
same data for a cross-section of countries. This approach was pioneered by Plosser 
(1993) who calculated the correlation between the rate of growth of per capita GDP 
and a range of variables for the OECD countries. The share of income and profit taxes 
in  GDP  was  found  to  have  a  correlation  of  -0.52  with  the  growth  rate  of  GDP. 
However, Plosser warns against taking the correlation as evidence of causality and presents  several  potential  explanations  for  the  lack  of  robustness  in  regression 
equations: most policies operate through investment; policies are complex and not 
easily represented by variables in regressions; and policies are highly correlated. Even 
so, the work of Plosser is often cited as evidence that an increase in taxation leads to a 
fall in the growth rate. 
  The left-hand panel of  Figure 3 displays an updated version of Chart 6 in 
Plosser (1993) that extends the sample period through to 2004. The data points are 
found by averaging the growth rate and the tax rate over this period for each country. 
A straight line fitted by least squares shows the negative relationship between the 
growth rate and the average tax rate. There are three countries that are unusual in this 
data set: Korea (the only Asian Tiger in this sample), the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic (both newly liberalized). These countries represent the three outliers 
in the data set. The right-hand panel shows the effect of removing these outliers: the 
negative relationship virtually vanishes (formally, it is statistically insignificant). This 
observation supports the claim that the negative relationship cannot be accepted until 
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Figure 3: Real income growth and tax rates in OECD countries 1960 -- 2004 
Source: Penn World Table Version 6.2 
  The  second  issue  is  the  definition  of  the  appropriate  tax  rate.  The  figures 
above use a measure of the average rate but economic theory argues that it is the 
marginal tax rate that matters for the degree of distortion introduced into choices. 
Using an average rate of tax to explain growth does not capture this important feature 
of taxation. This issue was addressed by Koester and Kormendi (1989) who used IMF 
data on 63 countries to construct measures of the average tax rate and the marginal tax 
rate. Their results are reported in Table 1. There is little evidence of an effect of either 
the average or the marginal tax rate upon the growth rate, but the marginal tax rate is 
claimed to have an effect on the level of activity. The tax rates are significant when 
used as the sole regressor but become insignificant when the level of initial GDP is 
included in the regression.  
Variable  A  B  C  D 
Constant  0.060  0.053  0.058  0.060 
Average tax  -0.074 
(-2.18) 
  -0.005 
(-0.11) 
 
Marginal tax    -0.25 
(-1.87) 
  -0.011 
(-087) 




R²  0.072  0.05  0.17  0.18 
Table 1: Regressions on marginal and average tax rates 
Source: Koester and Kormendi (1989) 
  This  methodology  is  also  open  to  criticism  since  it  assumes  a  constant 
marginal rate of tax despite significant changes in the tax systems in several of the 
countries over the period of the data set. There is also an issue concerning aggregation 
bias since the industrialized and non-industrialized countries may have very different 
responses of growth to taxation. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) employ several different 
measures of the marginal rate of tax plus a range of other potential determinants of 
growth  (initial  income,  school  enrolments,  assassinations,  revolutions  and  war 
casualties). They conclude "The evidence that tax rates matter for economic growth is 
disturbingly fragile". 
  The reasons for why no strong relationship is evident in the data are explored 
in Slemrod (1995). Figure 4 provides an updated view of the data used by Slemrod. 
The  figure  plots  growth  in  per  capita  GDP  against  government  expenditure  as  a 
proportion of GDP for 78 countries in 2004 using data from the Penn World Tables. 
As Slemrod observed there is no discernible pattern in this data. If there were a strong 
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Figure 4: Growth and government expenditure 2004. 
Source: Penn World Tables Version 6.2 
  The main argument of Slemrod (1995) is that the data is generated by the 
interaction of two structural relationships. On the one hand, an increase in government expenditure results in higher taxes implying further distortions that reduce the growth 
of  GDP.  On  the  other  hand,  growth  in  GDP  affects  the  demand  for  government 
expenditure  (for  example,  demand  will  increase  if  Wagner's  law  applies).  The 
estimation methodology has not adequately resolved the simultaneity between these 
two  relationships  and  therefore  the  estimated  coefficients  do  not  represent  the 
underlying structural equations. Moreover, if the level of government expenditure is 
chosen to maximize the rate of growth then the data should exhibit little variation: if 
the  countries  are  similar  the  observations  represent  points  clustered  around  the 
maximum of the relationship. If there are any differences in the relationship between 
expenditure  and  growth  across  countries  then,  combined  with  an  underlying 
optimization process, this will make for an even less meaningful relationship in the 
data. 
  There  is  much  evidence  in  favour  of  the  argument  that  the  data  reviewed 
above demonstrates no significant effect of the tax rate upon the rate of growth. The 
remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring the extent to which the observation of 
no link between taxation and growth in cross-country data can be consistent with a 
world in which taxation does affect economic growth. There are two components to 
the ideas we explore. First, we adopt the idea from endogenous growth theory that 
public sector expenditures are productive. In particular, we consider expenditure to be 
made on infrastructure that increases economic output. Therefore, taxation is not just 
a  cause  of  distortion  but  supports  expenditure  that  contribute  to  output.  It  can  be 
expected that governments will exercise rationality in the choice of the tax rate. This 
is a formalization of the argument that the data should represent countries clustered 
around an optimum. Second, we explore the existence of a mechanism through which 
growth is endogenously equalized between countries, or at least the differences are 
reduced. In our modelling this occurs in two ways: spill-overs of the benefits of public 
infrastructure between countries and the mobility of capital. The consequence of these 
mechanisms  is  that  an  increase  in  taxation  in  one  country  can  (in  certain 
circumstances) raise growth in all countries; hence, cross-country comparisons taken 
at one point in time will reveal no systematic relationship. These comments agree 
with a general perspective that what should be explained is not the differences in the 
growth rates between countries but instead why growth rates have been so similar 
over such large time spans. 
 
3.  Public Infrastructure 
Endogenous growth can occur when capital and labour are augmented by additional 
inputs in a production function that otherwise has non-increasing returns to scale. One 
interesting case for understanding the link between government policy and growth is 
when  the  additional  input  is  a  public  good  or  public  infrastructure  financed  by 
taxation. The need for public infrastructure to support private capital in production 
provides a positive role for public expenditure and a direct mechanism through which 
policy can affect growth. Introducing infrastructure permits an analysis of the optimal 
level of public expenditure in an endogenous growth model. 
  This  section  first  reviews  the  Barro  (1990)  model  of  productive  public 
expenditure. In this model public expenditure is financed by a tax on output. We then 
introduce the approach we adopt to analyze externalities by re-phrasing the analysis as 
a comparison across balanced growth paths with a tax upon the private capital input.   Public  infrastructure  can  be  introduced  by  assuming  that  the  production 
function for the representative firm at time t takes the form 
  a a a - - = 1 1
t t t t G K AL Y ,                 (1) 
where A is a positive constant and  t G  is the quantity of public infrastructure. The 
form of this production function ensures that there are constant returns to scale in 
labour,  t L ,  and  private  capital,  t K ,  for  the  firm  given  a  fixed  level  of  public 
infrastructure. Although returns are decreasing to private capital as the level of capital 
is increased for fixed levels of labour and public input, there are constant returns to 
scale in public input and private capital together. For a fixed level of  t L , this property 
of constant returns to scale in the other two inputs permits endogenous growth to 
occur. 
  The analysis of Barro (1990) assumes that public infrastructure is financed by 
a tax upon output. Assuming that capital does not depreciate, the profit level of the 
firm is 
  [ ] t t t t t t t t L w K r G K AL - - - =
- - a a a t p
1 1 1 ,           (2) 
where  t r  is the interest rate,  t w  the wage rate, and τ the tax rate. The government 
budget constraint requires that tax revenue finances the public infrastructure, so 
  t t Y G t = .                   (3) 
Now assume that labour supply is constant at  1 = t L  for all t and that the economy's 


















.                 (4) 
This specific form of utility is adopted to permit an explicit solution for the growth 






















,             (5) 
which can be combined with the input choices of the firm to show that the growth rate 
of consumption is related to the tax rate by 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 1 1
/ 1 1 1 / 1 1 - - + =




t t .         (6) 
  The result in (6) demonstrates the two channels through which the tax rate 
affects  the  growth  rate  of  consumption.  Taxation  reduces  the  growth  rate  of 
consumption through the term  t - 1  which represents the effect on the marginal return 
of capital reducing the amount of capital used. The tax rate increases growth through 
the term  [ ] a a t
- 1  which represents the gains through the provision of the public input. 
  Further insight into these effects can be obtained by plotting the relationship 
between the tax rate and consumption growth. This is shown in Figure 5 under the 
assumption that A = 1, α = 0.5, β = 0.95 and σ = 0.5. The figure displays two notable features. First, for low levels of the public input the rate of growth is negative, so a 
positive  tax  rate  is  required  for  there  to  be  consumption  growth.  Second,  the 
relationship between growth and the tax rate is non-monotonic: there is a tax rate 
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Figure 5: Tax Rate and Consumption Growth 
  Differentiation  of  (6)  determines  the  tax  rate  that  maximizes  consumption 
growth as 
  a t - =1 .                           (7) 
For the values in the figure, this optimal tax rate is τ = 0.5. To see what this tax rate 
implies, observe that 











a ,                         (8) 
using  t t Y G t =  and  a t - =1 . Hence, the tax rate that maximizes consumption growth 
ensures that the marginal product of the public input is equal to 1 which is also its 
marginal cost. 
  The analysis of growth described above works successfully for this particular 
form  of  the  model.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  generalize  the  approach  to  more 
complex  settings  in  a  way  that  permits  explicit  results  to  be  derived.  As  a 
consequence we adopt a different approach in the modelling that follows. The basis of 
this approach is that instead of looking at the growth path from an arbitrary starting 
point we instead focus on balanced growth paths. Along a balanced growth path all 
real variables grow at the same rate, so it can be interpreted as describing the process 
of growth in the long-run. 
  We model the consumer as choosing a balanced growth path given the path of 
tax rates announced by the government. The government then chooses the path of tax 
rates to maximize consumer welfare. If the tax is distortionary the resulting growth 
rate will not be first-best optimal. We see this analysis as the dynamic equivalent of 
maximizing  welfare  in  a  standard  static  Diamond-Mirrlees  type  framework.  In 
characterizing the equilibrium we exploit two equivalences. The first equivalence is that between the market equilibrium and the outcome when the consumer chooses the 
path of capital directly. This is a standard result that has been widely exploited to 
simplify the derivation of the path of capital accumulation in growth models. The 
second is that, in the long-run, the outcome with the consumer choosing the path for 
capital  is  equivalent  to  the  consumer  directly  choosing  the  rate  of  growth  of  the 
capital  stock  on  the  balanced  growth  path.  The  equivalence  holds  provided  the 
economy always tends to a balanced growth path, a property that we assume is applies 
to the economies we study. 
  We  now  make  two  changes  to  the  specification  of  the  Barro  model  to 
demonstrate this methodology. First, we assume that government spending is funded 
from  a  tax  levied  on  the  private  capital  input.  Second,  we  assume  that  public 
infrastructure  and  private  capital  depreciate  in  use  at  rates  0 ³ G d   and  0 ³ K d  
respectively. Under these assumptions the budget constraint of the government, or the 
law of motion for public infrastructure, at time t is 
  [ ] t t t G t K G G t d + - = -1 1 .               (9) 
The firm belongs to a representative infinitely-lived household whose preferences are 
from  this  point  described  by  an  instantaneous  utility  function,  t t C U ln = .  The 
household maximizes the infinite discounted stream of utility 






t C U b ,                        (10) 
subject to the sequence of intertemporal budget constraints, 
  [ ] t t K t t t K K C Y t d - - - + = + 1 1 ,                    (11) 
and with the sequence of taxes and government infrastructure taken as given. 
  We  focus  on  balanced  growth  path  equilibria,  along  which  the  tax  rate  is 
constant and all real variables grow at the same constant rate. The first step is to show 
that when  t K  grows at a constant rate γ and taxes are constant the law of motion for 
t G  also converges to growth at the same constant rate. Assume that the private capital 
stock grows at rate γ from time 0 with capital stock  0 K . Recursive substitution into 
(9) gives 
  [ ] 1 1 1 + + + - = t t G t K G G t d  












1 1 1 t d d .                   (12) 
From the relation 
  [ ] 0
1




- + + = g ,                       (13) 
it follows that 
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t .               (14) Hence, 
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+ 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 .                 (15) 
From (15) it can be seen that the effect of the initial levels disappears with time, and 













.                         (16) 
In  particular,  this  result  is  consistent  with  the  static  balanced  budget  constraint 
t t K = G t  if  1 = G d . When the economy is on the balanced growth path at time 0 it 











0 0 .                         (17) 
  The level of consumption at time t if the balanced growth path is achieved 
with capital  0 K  is 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] t d g g a a + + - + = -
K
t
t K G AK C 0
1
0 0 1 .                   (18) 
This gives the objective of the household as 
 







0 0 1 ln max
t
K
t t K G AK t d g g b
a a
g
.                 (19) 
The household takes government actions as given when optimizing so the values of τ 
and  0 G  are treated as fixed in the choice of the balanced growth path. The objective 
function can be rearranged as 
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.             (20) 
Assuming an interior solution exists, the necessary condition for the choice of γ is 








- + - t d g b g
b
a a
K K G AK
K
.                 (21) 

























0 .                     (22) 
The expression in (22) determines the balanced growth path chosen by the household 
in  response  to  the  tax  rate  and  level  of  public  infrastructure  selected  by  the government.  This  equation  summarizes  the  behaviour  of  the  private  sector  in  the 
model. 
  There  are  two  alternatives  ways  of  modelling  the  choice  problem  of  the 
government. Either the government can choose τ to maximize γ, or it can choose τ to 
maximize U taking into account the effect of τ on γ. In both cases the chosen value of 
τ and the level of government infrastructure are related by (22). It is now shown that 
these two options are, in fact, equivalent. Rearrangement of the objective function 
with further substitution from (22) gives 
 
[ ]















































       
[ ]





























0 2 K .                (23) 
Since only the first term depends upon policy instruments and is itself an increasing 
function of γ, it follows that maximizing γ is equivalent to maximizing U. 
  Using (22) and (17) the growth-maximizing tax rate solves 








































1 G K K A A A .      (24) 
One special case can be explicitly solved. With full depreciation of private and public 
capital, 
  [ ] [ ]
a a t
/ 1 1- = A ,                         (25) 
so the optimal tax rate increases as the elasticity  of output with respect to public 
infrastructure increases. For the general result it can be seen that the optimal tax rate 
is decreasing in  G d , increasing in  K d , and decreasing in β. Hence, the more patient is 
the  household  the  lower  should  be  the  optimal  tax  rate  supporting  public 
infrastructure. 
  This model of public infrastructure illustrates a sense in which there can be an 
optimal  level  of  government  expenditure  in  an  endogenous  growth  model.  The 
analysis shows how a study of the optimal tax rate can be undertaken by considering 
choice over different balanced growth paths. We now develop this technique in the 
context of a world economy with infrastructural externalities between countries. 
 
4.  Infrastructural Spill-Over 
This section analyzes  a model that incorporates infrastructural spill-overs between 
countries. The results show that uncoordinated optimization by countries will lead to 
under-investment in infrastructure. This provides a role for a supra-national body to 
coordinate the decisions of individual countries so as to secure an increase in the 
growth rate. We develop these results by retaining the focus upon the comparison of 
balanced growth paths.   The model of the previous section is extended to a multi-country setting in 
which production benefits from positive externalities created by global infrastructure. 
For country i at time t the level of output is given by 
  [ ]
a r r a - - G =
1 1
t it it it G AK Y .                       (26) 
The  measure  of  global  infrastructure  at  time  t,  t G ,  is  defined  as  the  total  public 
investment  in  infrastructure,  it it t G G + = G ,  where  it G   is  the  public  investment  in 
infrastructure in all countries other than i. The infrastructural externality is generated 
by the term  it G  appearing here. The interpretation is that both infrastructure within a 
country (the term involving  it G  in (26)) and the total level of infrastructure (the term 
involving  t G ) are relevant. 
  We  focus  on  balanced  growth  paths  along  which  all  real  variables  in  all 
countries grow at the same rate and the tax rates are constant over time. The equality 
of the growth rates across countries here is imposed, since the law of motion of the 
public capital in one country only ensures that the growth rates of the stock of public 
and private capital are equal in that country, but there is no reason of why the growth 
rates should be equal across countries. If we did not impose this assumption then the 
output of one country would eventually become arbitrarily small relative to the output 
of the other. An extension to the model that ensures the endogenous equalization of 
the growth rates is presented in the next section. 
  When the growth rates in the countries are equal, along the balanced growth 
path  t G  grows at the same constant rate as all other real variables, so that at any time 
t 
  [ ]
r r
























it t it .                   (27) 
The level of consumption at time t if the balanced growth path is reached with capital 
stock  0 K  is 







































0 0 1 .               (28) 
This gives the objective of the household as 
 






















































,             (29) 
which is the same as in the closed economy case, with total factor productivity now 
augmented  by  the  factor  [ ] [ ] a r - G
1
0 0 /G .  Therefore,  we  immediately  obtain  the 
expression for the chosen growth rate in the open economy with externalities,  


































0 ,                 (30) 
where  0 G  is related to  0 K  through (17), and  0 0 0 G G + = G . Using this expression we 
obtain for the lifetime utility function 
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0 2 K ,                 (31) 
as in the closed economy case. Thus, for the government maximizing the welfare of 
the representative household is equivalent to maximizing the growth rate. 
 
4.1 Independent Choice 
A government that does not internalize the externality chooses τ to maximize γ, taking 
0 K  and  0 G  as given. The growth-maximizing tax rate is determined implicitly by the 
solution to the pair of equations 
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  From this point we assume that the world consists of two countries. Along the 
balanced growth path all real variables in both countries grow at the same constant 
rate, γ. The governments do not coordinate their choice of taxes, so each government 
maximizes  only  the  welfare  of  its  representative  household.  We  assume  that  the 
discount rates and depreciation rates are equal across the countries. Furthermore, we 
assume that the technologies and the endowments in two countries are such that both 
countries  have  the  same  rate  of  growth.  The  latter  assumption  only  holds  if  the 
technologies and the endowments in two countries satisfy a certain relationship. This 
relationship is met if we assume symmetry between the countries 
  In Figure 6 a symmetric equilibrium without coordination between countries is 
illustrated. Denote the technology levels in the two countries by  A and  A , and the 
initial capital stocks when the balanced growth path is achieved by  0 K  and  0 K . The 
values  of  the  parameters  used  for  the  simulation  are:  β  =  0.9,  ρ  =  0.5,  α  =  0.5, 
2 . 0 = = G K d d ,  5 . 0 = = A A ,  2 0 0 = = K K .  The  solid  curve  depicts  the  utility-
maximizing growth rate (the optimal choice of the private sector) given the tax rate 
and level of public infrastructure and is, therefore, determined by the fundamentals of the economy -- endowments, preferences, and the production technology. The dashed 
curve describes the optimal choice of the tax rate by the government. The equilibrium 
occurs at the intersection of these two curves. One can see that the equilibrium tax 
rate is too low: with a higher tax rate higher growth, and, hence, higher welfare can be 









Figure 6: Optimal tax rate without coordination 
21 . 0 = =t t ,  042 . 0 = =g g . 
 
4.2 Coordination between Two Countries 
We showed in the previous section that without coordination the equilibrium growth 
rate is below the efficient level: when choosing the tax rate, and hence when choosing 
the level of public investment, each government ignores the positive externality of the 
investment in its own country upon the productivity and growth in the other country. 
In  this  section  we  show  that  the  efficient  rate  of  growth  can  be  achieved  via 
coordination. 
  Assume  that  the  two  governments  coordinate  their  policies  by  choosing 
simultaneously their tax rates to maximize the sum of the welfare of the representative 
households. This optimization can be written as the following: 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) g g g g
t t
= +    s.t.    max
,
U U .                       (34) 
where γ and g are implicitly defined by  
 










































A ,               (35)  
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max , with  g g = . When the two 
countries are identical the necessary condition for τ simplifies to 





















A .                     (37) 
Plotting (37) along with the equation for γ produces Figure 7, which uses the same 
values for the model parameters as for Figure 6. It can be seen that the coordinated tax 
rate is higher than in the case without coordination, and the growth rate is the highest 
that  can  be  achieved  in  the  economy  with  the  given  fundamentals.  As  expected, 







Figure 7: Coordinated choice of optimal tax rate 
37 . 0 = =t t ,  052 . 0 = =g g . 
 
4.3 Redistribution 
In this section we consider the possibility of intervention by a supra-national body 
that  collects  and  redistributes  tax  revenues  between  the  countries.  The  interaction 
between the central body and the national government is modelled as the following 
multi-stage game. At the first stage the supra-national body announces what share of 
the tax revenues will be collected from each national government for a centralized 
fund. At the second stage the national governments choose optimal tax rates. At the 
third  stage  the  supra-national  body  announces  how  the  centralized  fund  will  be 
divided between the two countries. Finally, the investments are made and production 
takes place. There is no coordination between the two national governments at any 
stage.   We  assume  that  a  fraction  θ  of  the  tax  revenue  is  collected  by  the  supra-
national body from the first country (and a fraction q  from the second country), and a 
fraction   (1 –   for the second country) of the total amount collected is returned to 
the national government. Thus, the law of motion of the public capital is 
  [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + W + - + - = t t t t G t K G G m t q d ,                   (38) 
where  1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + = W t t t t t K K t q qt . Thus, if the balanced growth path is achieved 
from t = 0 










= .                   (39) 
Since the households take the public capital investment into production as given, the 
optimization  problem  for  each  household  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  without 
redistribution solved in the previous section. Thus, the welfare-maximizing growth 
rate is determined by 
 



































A ,                (40) 
where now  0 G  is defined by (39), and 
  0 0 0 0 0 K K G G t t + = + = G .                       (41) 
We assume that the redistribution is costless, so that the total public investment is not 
changed. 
  Maximization of welfare by the government leads to the implicit solution for 
the optimal tax rate, 






































- = .             (42) 
Similarly, the second country's optimal tax rate is 








































- = .        (43) 
It can be seen from (42) and (43) that by correctly choosing ( ) m q q , ,  it is possible to 
induce  the  efficient  levels  of  the  national  tax  rates  when  there  is  no  cooperation 
between the governments. 
  This is illustrated in Figure 8. A comparison with the no coordination case 
shows that the redistribution results in a shift of the curve describing  the optimal 
choice  of  the  government,  and  this  shift  can  be  adjusted  so  that  the  resulting 
equilibrium is the one with the highest growth rate, i.e. the same outcome as with 
coordination. Note that to achieve this q  and q  must be negative: the central body 
announces subsidies to public investment in infrastructure. Such a policy is typical for 







Figure 8: Equilibrium with redistribution 
65 . 0 - = =q q ,  5 . 0 = m . 
 
5.  Capital Mobility 
A  limitation  of  the  analysis  in  the  previous  section  was  the  assumption  that  both 
countries would be on the same balanced growth path. This assumption was required 
because  the  model  lacked  a  mechanism  that  would  guarantee  the  equalization  of 
growth rates. Any asymmetry between the countries would imply that the GDP per 
capita of one country would eventually become insignificant relative to the other. This 
is unsatisfactory since growth paths are similar in practice so the model needs an 
endogenous mechanism that ensures the equality of the growth rates. 
  The process we use to ensure the equality of balanced growth paths is to allow 
capital to be mobile between countries. As the investors relocate capital to seek the 
highest  after-tax  return  the  outcome  will  ensure  that  the  growth  rates  in  the  two 
countries are the same. If the growth rates are equalized then the countries impose an 
additional dynamic externality on each: if one country raises its tax rate it will affect 
the growth rates of all countries. 
  In  this  section  the  model  is  extended  to  allow  the  consumers  in  the  two 
countries to relocate capital costlessly. Let  t k  ( t k ) denote the stock of capital owned 
by the "domestic" ("foreign") consumer. With perfect capital mobility each consumer 
will choose to invest in the country where the after-tax return on investment is higher. 
We  assume  that  the  tax  on  capital  is  collected  at  the  destination,  and  the  output 
produced in each country is divided between the two investors proportionally to their 
capital investments. 
  Let  [ ] 1 , 0 Î t l   denote  the  fraction  of  t k   invested  in  the  home  country  and 
[ ] 1 , 0 1 Î - t l  denote the fraction of  t k  invested there. Then   [ ] t t t t t k k K l l - + = 1 .                         (44) 
Similarly, for the foreign country 
  [ ] t t t t t k k K l l + - = 1 .                         (45) 
  Razin  and  Yuen  (1997)  hypothesized  that  capital  mobility  across  countries 
ensures  equalization  of  the  growth  rates  along  the  balanced  growth  path,  and 
illustrated this result in a two-country framework of endogenous growth with a human 
capital input. In what follows we show that a similar result holds in our model. The 
law of motion of the public capital in the foreign country is 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + - + - = t t t t t G t k k G G l l t d .                   (46) 
Let the capital stock owned by domestic investors,  t k , grow at a constant rate γ, and 
that owned by foreign investors,  t k , grows at rate g . Assuming the tax rate and the 
share  of  domestic  investment  are  constant,  and  iterating  in  (46),  we  obtain  the 
following: 
  [ ][ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + - + + - + + - + - - = t t t t t G G t k k k k G G l l t l l t d d  



































t d  





























t .               (47) 
Dividing both sides by  1 + t k , 


































































































0 .                 (48) 
It can be seen that in the long run the first term converges to zero and the second term 
is constant if and only if  g g = . Thus, in the balanced growth path equilibrium the 
long-run  growth  rates  for  the  two  countries  must  be  equal.  Also,  if  the  balanced 
growth path is achieved at t = 0 then 










= .                     (49) 
Similarly, for the home country it must be the case that 










= .                     (50) 
  The allocation of capital across the countries is chosen by each consumer to 
maximize their utility. An interior solution for λ corresponds to equalized net returns, 




































.                 (51) 
If the tax rates and the fundamentals are such that the left-hand side of (51) is greater 
than the right-hand side, i.e. the domestic net return to domestically-owned capital is 
higher that the foreign net return, then λ = 1, the home consumer invests all his capital 
at home. Conversely, if this left-hand side is less, i.e. the foreign net returns are higher 
than the domestic ones then λ = 0, and the home consumer invests all his capital 
abroad. The solution for the foreign consumer’s optimization problem is similar. Note 
that  in  every  case  we  consider  each  consumer  chooses  the  allocation  of  capital 
between countries taking the decision of other consumer, as well as the tax rates and 
public capital inputs in both countries, as given. 
 
5.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium 
When the two governments do not cooperate they simultaneously choose the tax rates 
to maximize the welfare of their own consumers, or, equivalently, the growth rates of 
their economies. Consider the decision of the domestic government, assuming that the 
optimal  allocation  of  capital  by  the  domestic  investor  is  in  the  interior.  The 
government does not internalize the externality and chooses τ to maximize γ, taking 
0 k ,  0 k , t , and  0 G  as given. However, each government realizes that its choice of tax 
will affect the capital allocation decisions of investors in both countries. 
  Thus, the home government's objective is to maximize γ implicitly defined by 































      [ ] [ ] l t tl d - - - - + 1 1 K  
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A ,            (52) 
where  ( )
G d g
g





, , and λ and l  solve (51) and the counterpart of the latter for 
the foreign investor. 
  There is no need to impose the equality of the growth rates: in equilibrium this 
is ensured by the optimal choice of capital allocation by the consumers. However, the 
equilibrium growth rate, in general, is not efficient because the externalities are not 
internalized even with mobile capital. 
  In Figure 9 the completely symmetric equilibrium with mobile capital when 
the governments do not coordinate their tax choice is illustrated for the same values of 
the model parameters as in the previous numerical examples. One can see that the 
equilibrium tax rates are even lower than in the no-coordination case with immobile 
capital, because of the tax competition effect: each government cuts their tax rate in 
order  to  attract  capital  from  abroad.  Thus,  capital  mobility  in  the  absence  of 







Figure 9: Optimal tax rate without coordination, with mobile capital 
1487 . 0 = =t t ,  . 0259 . 0 = = g g  
 
5.2 Cooperative equilibrium 
If the two governments cooperate in choosing taxes the equilibrium outcome can be 
improved. The efficient equilibrium growth rate is achieved when the externalities are 
internalized,  i.e.  the  two  governments  choose  their  tax  rates  simultaneously  to 
maximize the sum of the two welfare functions. 





max ,                           (53) 
where γ is implicitly defined by 
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      [ ] [ ] l t tl d - - - - + 1 1 K  
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A ,               (54) 
 
5.3 Non-cooperative equilibrium with redistribution 
As in the case of immobile capital considered in the previous section, a policy of 
intervention  by  a  supra-national  government  can  achieve  the  first-best  outcome 
through correction of the externality. The intervention is again modelled as a multi-
stage game. Since the households take the public capital investment into production as given, the optimization problem for the household is the same as in the case without 
redistribution. We assume that the central body runs a balanced budget. 
  Under the redistribution scheme along the balanced growth path 










= ,                     (55) 
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= ,                 (56) 
where 
  [ ] 0 0 0 1 k k K l l - + = ,                         (57) 
and 
  [ ] 0 0 0 1 k k K l l - + = .                         (58) 
  The domestic government chooses τ to maximize γ implicitly defined by 
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A .       (59) 
where 

















t m q t qm q
d g
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t g j .                   (60) 
The foreign government faces a similar optimization. 
  By choosing { } m q q , ,  the supra-national body can shift the reaction functions 
of the two governments so that the equilibrium choice of taxes coincides with the 
first-best  outcome.  There  is  no  closed-form  solution,  but  we  can  characterize  it 
qualitatively. Since the  externality from public  investment is positive, in the non-
cooperative equilibrium the taxes will be set too low. In addition, capital mobility will 
cause  tax  competition  between  the  governments,  which  will  result  in  even  lower 
taxes. To achieve efficiency the supra-national body needs to encourage higher taxes, 
which requires q  and q  to be negative. Once the supra-national body announces that 
it will subsidize public investment in each country, the governments set higher taxes. 
After that the subsidies are claimed back. Figure 10 demonstrates that the maximum 







Figure 10: Effect of central body, with mobile capital 
361 . 0 = =t t ,  . 27 . 1 - = =q q  
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
There is no convincing  empirical evidence of  a relationship between taxation and 
economic growth in cross-country data. We have argued that the lack of a relationship 
is not inconsistent with the growth rate being increased by additional public sector 
expenditure.  The  explanation  offered  to  resolve  this  apparent  contradiction  is  that 
public sector expenditure is productive, that there are spill-overs of the benefits of 
public  infrastructure  between  countries,  and  that  capital  is  internationally  mobile. 
These mechanisms make it possible for an increase in taxation in one country to raise 
the  growth  rate  in  all  countries.  This  effect  will  not  be  apparent  in  cross-country 
comparisons taken at one point. 
  This argument is reflected in the summary of results presented in Table 2. This 
reports the growth rate for the two models of immobile capital and mobile capital for 
a range of values of the fraction θ of the tax revenue collected by the supra-national 
body. The first observation is that with no intervention (θ = 0) the growth rate is 
below  the  maximum  level.  With  immobile  capital  this  reflects  the  inefficiency 
resulting from the spill-over of infrastructure. The growth rate with no intervention is 
even lower when capital is mobile because this creates an additional externality. The 
rate of growth is increased when θ becomes negative since this provides an incentive 
for the countries to increase their tax rates. 
Table 2: Growth rate and intervention 
q  -1.4  -1.2  -1.0  -0.8  -0.6  -0.4  -0.2  0  0.2  0.4 
Immobile  0.039  0.045  0.049  0.051  0.052  0.050  0.047  0.042  0.034  0.025 
Mobile  0.052  0.052  0.051  0.048  0.045  0.042  0.034  0.026  0.017  0.006   The policy implications of our analysis are that although public expenditure 
can  assist  growth  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  optimal  level  of  growth  will  be 
achieved. The design of public expenditure has to take into account the infrastructure 
externalities  and  the  capital  flows.  If  the  choices  of  individual  countries  are  not 
coordinated  then  the  outcome  will  be  inefficient  and  growth  will  not  be  welfare-
maximizing. A coordinating body, such as the European Commission, has a role to 
play in attaining an efficient level of expenditure on public infrastructure. This role 
involves  supporting  the  expenditure  decisions  of  individual  countries  to  raise  the 
overall level of expenditure. 
 
Appendix 
The Appendix provides the derivation of the results used in the main text. 
A4.1 Independent Choice 
A government that does not internalize the externality chooses τ to maximize γ, taking 
0 K  and  0 G  as given. The resulting value of γ is given by 
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A ,              (A1) 
where  ( )
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, . Total differentiation gives 
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.                (A2) 
Using (A1) this can be re-written as the following: 
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1 .            (A3) 
Thus, the growth-maximizing tax rate is determined implicitly by the solution to the 
pair of equations 





























a t ,              (A4)   ( )
[ ]































A .              (A5) 
  If the world consists of two countries the equilibrium tax rates and the growth 
rate  solve  the  following  system  of  equations  (assuming  the  discount  rates  and 
depreciation rates are equal across the countries): 



























a t ,                (A6) 







































































A ,               (A8) 
and 
     

























































A .     (A9) 
The last equality is obtained from the equality of the two growth rates. This implies an 
additional restriction on the fundamentals, { } 0 0, , , K K A A . In other words, to achieve 
the  balanced  growth  path  a  certain  relationship  between  the  technologies  and  the 
endowments  in  two  countries  must  hold.  These  conditions  are  met  if  we  assume 
symmetry between the countries in the sense that  A A= , and  0 0 K K = . 
A4.2 Coordination between Two Countries 





































A .             (A10) 
This gives the necessary condition for τ as 





















A .                  (A11) 
A4.3 Redistribution 
The law of motion of the public capital is 
  [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + W + - + - = t t t t G t K G G m t q d ,                (A12) 
where  1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + = W t t t t t K K t q qt . Iterating with respect to t yields 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ∑ W + - - + - =
=
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1 1 1 1 m t q d d ,          (A13) and if the capital stock grows at a constant rate γ in both countries, whereas the tax 
rates and redistribution rates are constant, 
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+ .              (A14) 
Thus, if the balanced growth path is achieved from t = 0 










= .                (A15) 
Since the households take the public capital investment into production as given, the 
optimization  problem  for  the  household  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  without 
redistribution. Thus, the welfare-maximizing growth rate is determined by 
 



































A ,             (A16) 
where  
  0 0 0 0 0 K K G G t t + = + = G .                    (A17) 
  A government that does not internalize the externality chooses τ to maximize 
γ, taking  0 K  and  0 G  as given. Now 
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where 
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t g j .              (A19) 
Total differentiation gives 
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.            (A20) 
We therefore obtain the implicit solution for the optimal tax rate, 






































- = .          (A21) 
Similarly, the second country's optimal tax rate is 








































- = .     (A22) 
 
A5.  Capital Mobility 
The law of motion of the public capital in the foreign country is 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + - + - = t t t t t G t k k G G l l t d .                (A23) 
Let the capital stock owned by domestic investors,  t k , grow at a constant rate γ, and 
that owned by foreign investors,  t k , growth at rate g . Assuming the tax rate and the 
share  of  domestic  investment  are  constant,  and  iterating  in  (A23),  we  obtain  the 
following: 
  [ ][ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + - + + - + + - + - - = t t t t t G G t k k k k G G l l t l l t d d  
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t .            (A24) 
Dividing both sides by  1 + t k , 


































































































0 .              (A25) 
The first term converges to zero and the second term is constant if and only if  g g = . 
If the balanced growth path is achieved at t = 0  










= .                  (A26) 










= .                  (A27) 
  With capital flows the budget constraint of the domestic consumer becomes 
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and along the balanced growth path 
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where 
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and 
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.                  (A32) 
The lifetime utility of the home consumer is 























t .              (A33) 
Assume that two consumers simultaneously choose the allocation of capital and after 
that simultaneously choose the optimal growth rate. Solving backwards we first solve 
the first-order condition for γ. For the home consumer we have 
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- = ,                (A34) 
and, substituting this back into the utility function, 
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2 .                    (A36) For the interior solution this is equal to zero. From (A34) 





















,          (A37) 
so that 
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.             (A38) 
Differentiation gives 
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.          (A39) 
This equation is expressed as the difference in net returns. Thus, an interior solution 
for λ corresponds to the equalized net returns. If the tax rates and the fundamentals are 
such that this difference is positive, i.e. domestic net returns to domestically-owned 
capital then λ = 1, the home consumer invests all his capital at home. Conversely, if 
this difference is negative, i.e. the foreign net returns are higher than the domestic 
ones then λ = 0, and the home consumer invests all his capital abroad. 
  The solution for the foreign consumer is similar: 













































,          (A40) 
so that l  = 1 when the difference is positive, l  = 0 when the difference is negative, 
and l  is between zero and one when the two net returns are equalized. Note that each 
consumer chooses his capital allocation taking the decision of other consumer, as well 
as the tax rates and public capital inputs in both countries as given. Thus, in (A39) and 
(A40) 
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.                 (A42) 
Suppose, λ is in the interior. Then one can see from (A41) and (A42) that l  is also in 
the interior i.f.f.  0 0 0 0 / / K Y K Y = . Therefore, interior solutions for both λ and l  may 
exist for a particular combination of endowments and productivities. If the optimal 
choice of  l  is zero, then it must be the case that in equilibrium  0 0 0 0 / / K Y K Y < . Conversely, if the optimal choice of  l  is one it must be the case that in equilibrium 
0 0 0 0 / / K Y K Y > . 
A5.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium 
The domestic government's objective is to maximize γ implicitly defined by 
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where  ( )
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, , and λ and l  solve 
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l .              (A46) 
Here, from the viewpoint of the domestic government, 
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.          (A48) 
The foreign government chooses τ to maximize γ defined implicitly by 
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A ,         (A49) 
but, since it takes  0 G  as given, from the viewpoint of the foreign government 
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.              (A51) 
There is no need to impose the equality of the growth rates: in equilibrium this is 
ensured by the optimal choice of capital allocation by the consumers. However, the 
equilibrium growth rate, in general, is not efficient because the externalities are not 
internalized even with mobile capital. 
A5.1.1 Symmetric case: identical endowments and productivities 
Consider the case where  A A =  and  0 0 k k = . The choice of the domestic and the 
foreign investors, l  and l , solve 
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l .              (A54) 
Here 
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. Thus, there exists a 








, and for the equilibrium 









  The growth rate in the domestic country is determined by 
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,            (A57) 
and in the foreign country by 
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.            (A58) 
Clearly, the completely symmetric equilibrium is consistent with  g g = .  
 
A5.2 Cooperative equilibrium 
Here γ is implicitly defined by 
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and 
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.              (A61) 
A5.3 Non-cooperative equilibrium with redistribution 
The domestic government chooses τ to maximize γ implicitly defined by 
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where 
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.          (A65) 
The foreign government chooses t  to maximize γ implicitly defined by 
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where 
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